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to the conference table. Much would depend on whether our departure suited China's interest at that time.
70.
In our view the acceptance of a measure of indirect Chinese control (the second course) will not at any time provide an acceptable means of withdrawal. On the face of it, it could have the merit of frustrating the worst Chinese intentions; and, by a process of gradual assimilation to Chinese control, it might help to avoid the disruptive, possibly violent, consequences of a sudden transfer of authority. But, as has been noted in paragraph 14 of our Interim Report, it would put us entirely in the hands of the Chinese, both as to the manner and timing of our final departure; our bargaining position would be compromised when it came to seeking an eventual settlement; our people there would be hostages who would be used to extract the
maximum concessions. We would be faced by serious economic
and political repercussions in Hong Kong in a situation of dwindling confidence. Additionally any lack of effective authority could raise acute political difficulties in relation to Ministers' responsibilities to Farliament for the administration of the territory. We might find that our control was so circumscribed as to prevent our making any attempt to discharge our responsibilities to even the vulnerable category of Chinese in Hong Kong.
Song
71. From the third course the possibility of negotiating our withdrawal there could be no drawing back if the terms were unacceptable; our internal position in Hong Kong could not survive abortive negotiations, even if the Chinese were prepared to accept the situation. We might have to offer, during the negotiations or as part of the negotiated settle-
ment, to associate the Chinese with the administration of
the Colony as a means of maintaining the internal security situation, but as a course to be pursued deliberately, even in a situation where the Chinese are showing a spirit of reasonable co-operation, it would carry some great dangers. From a position within the administration, the Chinese would have an infinite capacity to interfere. At any time they would be able to instigate trouble among their supporters and then to hamper or frustrate our efforts to deal with it. If
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