OLMA
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i)
(j)
k)
Their
Government, to a position of subservience using the methods of long term "struggle". immediate ains are to maximise their commercial
interests in the Colony and to concentrate on broadening the base of their support among the people. In certain circumstances, however, this policy might quickly change to one of reducing the Colony to a position of subservience or even of taking it over.
We have virtually no means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Chinese to change whatever course of action they decide on. We should nevertheless keep under review the scope for withdrawing services and facilities (e.g. in banking and shipping) in the event of another "confrontation".
It is unlikely that the Chinese would wish to take
Hong Kong by direct military attack; it would be more in keeping with their theory of indigenous revolution to create, by local action, a break-
down of authority in the Colony.
As 1997 approaches confidence will inevitably drain away with adverse political and economic effects
making it increasingly difficult for us to main- tain our position. This will raise some tough
problems in the spheres of economic and social
policy and in the public service; studies of these problems (necessarily conducted within a limited circle) can best be put in hand in Hong Kong.
American Involvement (Paragraphs 51-53)
1) The Americans make great use of Hong Kong and
would wish us to stay, at least as long as there is a Communist Government in Peking not recognised by them.
(m) Fear of American retaliation (which we might foster)
may inhibit the Chinese from taking any action that could be clearly defined as "Chinese agression". Wo might consider separately whether we should soek American support and understanding for the policies we desire to adopt.
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/Withdrawal
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