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disposal will, in fact, benefit our relations with
China only if effected by agreement.
Only by
agreement are we likely to extricate ourselves in a
manner which does not sacrifice our interests and
obligations.
(ii) We cannot usefully seek such agreement or understanding
with the present régime in China or in the
(iii)
foreseeable future. It is in any case unlikely
that China would agree to talk with us about
relinquishing Hong Kong while the Colony's economic
value to that country remains high.
While Hong Kong in our hands remains of great economic
importance to China we can expect some pressure but
not so great as in Chinese eyes will sap our will to
stay there. As its economic importance to China
declines (as seems likely in the 1980s) we must
anticipate that the Chinese will exert the maximum
leverage that our predicament affords them.
(iv) We cannot make an overt approach to China.
Confidence in Hong Kong is fragile and would not
survive the knowledge that we were discussing
possible terms for withdrawal.
Moreover we cannot
predict the Chinese response and could not run the
risk of a rebuff. The only course that might
conceivably be open to us would be the informal
approach aimed at a tacit understanding
(Conclusion (t) of the Report).
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/ (v).
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