TNAG-0123-FCO40-159-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1971 — Page 165

1

}

TOP SECRET

Withdrawal (Faragraphs 54-83)

(n) Hong Kong's future must eventually lie in China. This

is likely to become an issue in the 1980s (when

confidence and the economy must inevitably start to run down) or earlier if, in the meantime, Chinese pressures carry the indication that China has a serious intention to make our position untenable. But in present circumstances we need not - indeed,

we cannot contemplate action to this end. (o) When we do decide to withdraw we will face major

problems (some insoluble) in the discharge of our responsibilities towards the Chinese section of the community (particularly those who are British sub- jects or who may be vulnerable to retaliation because of their loyalty to the British connection)

and in the maintenance of internal security during

the period of withdrawal.

(p) The nature of these problems points to the need for

some understanding with the Chinese. We can in any

case put out of our minds any thought of an independent status for Hong Kong, under U.N. auspices or otherwise. We shall have to hand over sovereignty

to China,

(a) A unilateral decision on our part to withdraw would

be a course of last resort in present circumstances.

This would invite severe harassment by the Chinese

who would not acquiesce in our withdrawal at our own speed and in our own way; and we could not prevent their interference. At some future date it might

ne used to bring the Chinese to the conference table. (r) At present the only solution acceptable to the

Chinese would be to gain indirect control over the administration of the Colony. This we must avoid at any time as a step towards ultimate withdrawal. (s) There might be an opportunity to negotiate withdrawal

although we cannot see when this might arise. We should avoid if at all possible any form of joint administration of the Colony prior to handing over

TOP SECRET

/since

Page 165Page 166