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We, for our part, appear to have discussed at some length the question of whether these schools should be allowed to open, but not the question of opening more new schools ourselves to counter the communist ones.
Mere at least a case for arguing that Hong Kong could best meet the communist threat by spending more on social services, especially education. This would require increased revenue, presumably from increases in taxation; 7 foreign investment, and the Hong Kong economy in general, are likely to suffer less from such a step than from the approach of 1997. Such a policy might, on the other hand, check or at least significantly delay the growth: of support for the communists in Hong Kong end of any swing in Hong Kong opinion in favour of rejoining China (paragraph 55(b)). It would also reduce the chances of our eventual withdrawal being impeded by internal subversion. Paragraph 44 of the paper under reference admits that our ability to influence Feking's attitude is minimal, but we can at least to to counter Peking's influence.
6.
I am doubtful, incidentally, about the validity of the assertion in paragraph 55(b) that "the emergence in Hong Kong of a generation that law its roots only in the Colony militates against (a swing of opinion in favour of rejoining China)". I suspect that the reverse is true: that this generation, being frustrated of outlets for its energy and abilities,
end never having had first hand experience of life under the communist system,
its will be readier than their parents to take the plunge. The more we cas retain their loyalty and support by development of non-communist education and other social services, the greater our chances of avoiding further unrest in Hong Kong and of achieving, eventually, a smooth hand-over.
Munth.
(A.J. HUNTER)
21st January 1968
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