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Em
Caray of
descièse
wild F.E.D
미
Dunand my
in
that
a ban
thie newspaper be lifts.
Communit comply with a Chinese ultimatumen the treatment of
gr is probable
communist Press representatives in Hong Kong. Recent
Mat
exchanges with the Chinese indicate that members of the
British Mission and also possibly other British subjects]
were
in China are being held as hostages_by the Chinese in order
Yty to
No
to secure concessions on Hong Kong, it is just as likely, howeve
that they would similarly use our Mission, etc. to bring pressur
to bear on us for other ends)
Economic
At that The Chinese might still hope that. Detaming Brition subjects will help to achieve Ingat ass
5. Our exports to Hong Kong in 1967 were £62 million f.o.b. mough in viewd
ved (of the same order as our exports to Japan), a proportion of of men failure which goes on to other markets through Hong Kong. If the with the Mission
This man
largely to
bi
satisfm mui Supportin ArryKing
Hong Kong market was lost to us, we might save what we could
sell direct in the markets hitherto supplied through Hong Kong,
but clearly a lot of these frustrated exports would be
difficult to sell elsewhere at first.
6. Our imports from Hong Kong in 1967 were £89 million c.i.f.,
of which £34 million was in clothing and £18 million in textiles,
If these imports were totally stopped, there would be some
substitution, particularly from other Eastern suppliers, of
all types of goods; in the case of textiles, which are subject
to quantitative control, such substitution could be regulated.
We derive some economic advantage in being able to obtain cheap
supplies from Hong Kong. Their loss might lead to a rise in
prices of certain goods in the United Kingdom but there would,
of course, be relief from the embarrassment (mainly political)
caused by the competition of Hong Kong exports with our textile
and certain light industries.
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17.
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