TNAG-0122-FCO40-158-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 84

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SECRET

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY

(a)

The following are the recommendations of the study.

We should recognise that Hong Kong's future must eventually

lie in China and that our objective must be to attempt to

negotiate its return, at a favourable opportunity, on the

best terms obtainable for its people and for our material

interests there.

(b) Withdrawal should not be contemplated while present conditions

in China persist. We could not now negotiate terms that

would in any measure meet our responsibilities towards the

people or our material interests.

(c) We should watch for an acceptable opportunity to negotiate or

reach some understanding with the Chinese on our withdrawal,

if and when a suitable regime emerges there. It is important

to do this when not under Chinese pressure and before the

economy of the Colony starts to run down in the 1980s.

Meanwhile we should show firmly that we intend to maintain

our position there, giving no indication that we contemplate

withdrawal. To this end we should keep under inter-

departmental review what means we may have from time to time of

countering any renewed Chinese pressure.

(a)

(e)

The likely effects in the Colony of the approach of 1997 should

be discreetly studied locally and policy in Hong Kong reviewed

in the light of the results.

(f) At regular intervals and at any time the Chinese regime or

attitude towards the Colony change significantly, future

(g)

policy towards the Colony should be reviewed, in consultation

with the Governor.

In the event of an armed attack the Colony should remain under

civil control. The Dormant Commission (under which the

Governor would in certain circumstances hand over to the

Commander, British Forces) should accordingly be revoked.

SECRET

Comments

Approved members can add comments, bookmarks, and private notes.

No comments yet.

Private Research Note

Private notes are available after approval.