TNAG-0122-FCO40-158-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 69

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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on the timing of an approach all the considerations

indicate that we should make it as soon as there

emerges in China a regime with which we might do

business and before the Hong Kong economy starts to

run down in the 1980s we should avoid any time when

the Hong Kong economy is showing weakness or we are -

under Chinese pressure?

The Worst Case (Paras 84-91)

(x) In the event of a Chinese military attack obviously

mounted with the objective of taking over Hong Kong

we would surrender the Colony with only a show of

resistance. Unremitting Chinese pressure short of a

military take-over could render our position untenable

and lead us to the conclusion that we must withdraw

with or without Chinese co-operation.

(y) In either event China might not accept our renunciation

force us to maintain

of control but might aim to establish a puppet British

administration under their control. In such circumstances

it might be better to co-operate with them rather than to

sever, as in a formal way we could easily do, our political

and economic connections with the Colony.

(z) However these are decisions which can be taken only in

the light of the circumstances at the time. We consider

that whatever may happen in Hong Kong the Governor should

remain in charge of the civil administration of the

Colony and therefore that the Dormant Commission conferring

full administrative authority upon the Commander, British

Forces, should be revoked.

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/J.

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