TNAG-0122-FCO40-158-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 59

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and force us to withdraw on their terms. The initiative

would seem to be in our hands only to the extent that:-

(a) the economic value of Hong Kong might be so

important to China that they would be prepared

to treat with us to preserve this so far as

possible after our departure;

(b) the settlement of Hong Kong's future could be

linked with a desire by China for a detente

in its international relations.

84.

H. THE WORST CASE

In the event of a Chinese military attack with the

object of taking over Hong Kong, present instructions (as

embodied in the directive to the Commander, British Forces)

(Take in be" to

slyp)

are that military action should be/

to expose any Chinese

incursion into the Colony with armed force as an act of

In both cases the intention has been that-

aggression". We would not resist to the bitter end, laying

ん

resent for a brief period and then waste to Hong Kong in the process, but would/withdraw before

greatly superior forces. In short we would surrender Hong

an mitial short period of determined

a

Kong with only show of resistance.

85. If as a result of unremitting Chinese pressure on

Hong Kong (short of a military take-over) we were forced

to the point that our position was untenable and that our

administration could not survive without conceding a measure

of influence and control to China, our conclusion is that we

would have to take a unilateral decision to withdraw with all

its attendant difficulties. The timing of such a decision

would be very difficult. If the situation had reached that

point, we would have to accept that the process of withdrawal

would not be easy since it would greatly depend on Chinese

/goodwill,

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