THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
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however, probably true that they would only be deterred in
this way from military action against Hong Kong which could
be clearly defined as "Chinese aggression". It is much less
likely that a deterrent of this sort could put an end to the
incitement to subversion in Hong Kong, since the Chinese would
calculate, quite correctly, that there is no point at which
such subversion can be considered as the justification for
nuclear retaliation against China.
Though the)
53.
wish
domestic h Americans would like us to stay in Hong Kong for ae as well as international reasons they world be most reluctant to < long as possible because of Hong Kong's value
and its political value as a Free World enclave on
the mainland of China. For domestic as well as international
reasons, however, they would be very unlikely to be willing to
give a public nuclear guarantee for Hong Kong nor for our own
reasons would we wish them to do so. There is, however, advantage
in trying to make the Chinese believe that the Americans are
involved in or committed to the defence of Hong Kong. The
continued presence of American warships in Hong Kong is helpful
ese/ne in this connection. It might be helpful to seek American support and understanding for the policies which we desire to adopt. The advantages and disadvantages together with the ways and means of doing so might be considered separately.
G. WITHDRAWAL
54 Hong Kong's geographical position, its preponderantly Chinese population, the artificial nature of its económic
and political base
these factors, coupled with China's declared claims and intentions, indicate that the Colony's Future must
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/inevitably
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