TNAG-0122-FCO40-158-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 33

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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There is evidence that China's current conclusion is to

leave things as they are.

General Aims

40. The Chinese intention is to take over Hong Kong, by

1997 at the latest. For the present, however, they seek to

gain the maximum degree of control over our actions consistent

with the maintenance of Hong Kong's value to them.

૧.

Sufficient to

They seek

spen measure of control as would leave them poised to take

over at any convenient time when we would either be bustled

out ignominiously or held as hostages.

The

41. The Chinese will move to recover Hong Kong whenever our disadvantages to them of car position there ontweigh the advantages position there becomes intolerable to them to the point where They derive from Hong Kongsrelamiing a

its value to them insufficiently justifies Hong Kong's separate

existence. They will use whatever forcible means are

necessary, which will include the mounting of a campaign of

internal violence supported by imported trained agents and

weapons.

42. It is likely that China would prefer not to have to take

Hong Kong by direct military attack, though such an attack

could not but succeed.

It would be more in keeping with

China's position on the efficacy of indigenous revolution

to create a situation in which local action would seem to

have caused a total breakdown and where a resort to military

force would be necessary, if at all, only to administer the

coup de grace. However, a display of military force might

be mounted in order to allow the Chinese to pose to the

populace as "liberators": and if all else failed and a

take-over became imperative, direct attack would unhesitatingly

be resorted to.

/Short-term Policies

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