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[Take in
丽
as (i) and
(ii)
7
course, bear in mind that the Chinese communist concept of
"negotiations" is very different from ours and we cannot
hope to put our meaning on this word; in their eyes a
"negotiation" is the process by which their demands, once
presented, are uncompromisingly pursued until the opposition
is worn down into accepting them by a combination of
persistance, psychological pressures and even physical
threats.
38. It is inconceivable that any communist Chinese government
would "negotiate" an extension of the Hong Kong lease, It is
extremely unlikely that a Chinese government of any complexion
•would be prepared to do so, although there is a remote
possibility that by 1997 (when the lease expires), there
might be a government in Peking which would be prepared to
acquiesce in an extension of the status quo without any formal
re-negotiation of the lease. If we had a Chinse government
X
so reasonably inclined there might well be little need for us
would be
to stay since it could indicate the kind of government to
which we could conscientiously hand over.
39. The considerations likely to influence the Chinese in a
decision either to take over the Colony or to maintain the
status quo are set out below:-
(a) Towards a take-over
(ii)
National feeling: this might move naturally
against foreign occupation of parts of Chinese
more likely
a
to galvanise on thuscasin at territory or/it could be stimulated for internal home which conid be harnessed to some domestic objective, as reasons (e.g, internal political strife) to focus. occurred with the "Resist America Aid Korea Movement “. attention on an external issue with highly emotional
or nationalistic overtones.
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/Gii)
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