now maintain in Hong Kong 15 about ₤20 milliont
a year; it bo estimated that after 1971 it will be
xist
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18.
At a time when we are reducing our other commitments
and forces East of Suez, it is important to maintain
confidence in the Colony in our intention to maintain our
position there. Certainly we must not give the Chinese the
impression that we were preparing to leave. Because of the
political decision to withdraw our forces from Singapore/
Malaysia at some stage it will become impossible to continue
to provide support and backing for Hong Kong from the theatre.
An internal security situation could arise and get rapidly
out of control, and as our garrison will then be at the end of
a long line of communications its effective and timely
reinforcement would be dependent on adequate warning,
availability of an air route, overflying permission and the
absence of any other concurrent major operation. We cannot
be certain that all these conditions will emerge in our favour
and it will therefore be necessary for us to make a modest
increase in the permanent strength of the forces to meet our
there fore responsibilities. Ministers have recently agreed that after
1971 the forces should consist of the following:-
7 major units
Army
Navy
2
R. A. F.
frigates
5 coastal minesweepers
1 small tanker
6 Whirlwind helicopters.
Ministers have also approved the stationing of a small unit
of fighter aircraft in Hong Kong, "subject to further
examination of the possibility that these aircraft might be
manned and serviced from local resources.
ft
19.
The full budgetary cost of the forces we shall need to
maintain in Hong Kong after 1971 is estimated to be £25 million
/(excluding
c. year
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