TNAG-0122-FCO40-158-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 155

SECRET

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to hand it ovop with that ralco unimpaired and its trading links

with Western comtries kept open. To use this card changed

attitudes towarda China on the part of some Western countries will

be a prerequisite

(w) The initiative does not effectively lie in our hands:

the Chinese could always frustrate our attempts to negotiate or

reach an understanding with then, But on the timing of an approach

all the considerations indicate that we should nsko 16 as soon as

there emerges in China a regine with which we might do business and

before the Hong Kong economy starts to run down in the 1980s.

The Foxet Base

(x) In the event of a Chinese nilitary attack obviously mounted

with the objective of taking over Hong Kong we would surender the

short pari och Colony with only a show or resistance. Unremitting Chinese pressure

;.

Short of a military take-over could perder o position untenable

and lead up to the conclusion that we must withdraw with or without

Chinese co-operation.

(r). In either event China might not accept our renunciation

of control but might aim to force us to maintain a puppet

administration under their control. In such circumstances it

might be better to co-operate with them rather than to sever, as in

a formal way we could easily do, our political end economic

connections with the Colony.

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(E) However these are decisions which can be taken only in the

light of the circumstances at the time. We consider that whatever

may happen in Hong Kong the Governor should remain in charge of the

civil administration of the Colony and therefore that the Dormant

Commission conferring full administrative authority upon the

Commander, British Forces, should be revoked.

A

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