political advantages. The' campaign of violence has been abandoned for the present and they apparently recognise that it
may take a long tins to bring the Hong Kong Government to a position of subservienemping the methods of long term "struggle"
Their immediate eine ere to maximize their commercial interests
in the Colony and to concentrate on broadening the base of their
support among the people. In certain circumstances, however, this policy might quickly change to one of reducing the Colony to a
position of subservience or even of taking it over.
(3) We have virtually no geans of bringing pressure to bear The Chinese upon Chámá to change whatever course of action they decide on. We should nevertheless keep under review the scope for withdrawing
services and facilities in the event of another "confrontation",
(5) It do unlikely that the Chinese would wich to take long Kong by direct military attack; it would be more in keeping with their theory of indigenous revolution to create, by local action,
& breakdown of authority in the Colony,
(1) As 1997 approaches confidence will inevitably drain away with adverse political and economic effects making it increasingly
This will raise some difficult for us to maintain our position,
tough problems in the spheres of cconomic and cocinl policy and in the public service in which studies (necessarily conducted within a limited circle) are being put in hand in Hong Kong.
(1) The Americana make great use of Hong Kong and would wish
up to stay.
(a) Fear of fuerican retaliation (which we might foster) may
inhibit the Chinese fron taking any action that could be
fclearly
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