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or who may be vulnerable to retaliation because of
their loyalty to the British connection) and in the
maintenance of internal security during the period
of withdrawal.
(p) The nature of these problems points to the need for
some understanding with the Chinese. We can in any
case put out of our minds any thought of an independent
status for Hong Kong, under U.N. auspices or otherwise.
We shall have to hand over sovereignty to China.
(a) A unilateral decision on our part to withdraw would
be a course of last resort in present circumstances.
This would invite severe Chinese harassment;
would not acquiesce in our withdrawal at our own speed
and in our own way; and we could not prevent their interference. At some future date it might be used to
bring the Chinese to the conference table.
The Amm
they
(r) At the present (time) the only solution acceptable to
to gam
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looking.
the Chinese would be a Macao-type situation,
circumscribing our control over the administration
of the Colony. This we must avoid at any time as
a step towards ultimate withdrawal.
(s) There might be an opportunity to negotiate withdrawal
although we cannot see when this might arise but Whe
Shouw
mus
ast/avoid if at all possible any form of joint control of the administration of the Colony prior to
handing over since this would give the Chinese an
infinite capability for mischief and for frustrating
our intentions.
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