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to Stomata blung
calculate, would cause the Chinese to reflect on their own
15
Yrue
interests and which would alse bring home to them the measure of
To this end it might
our determination to maintain our position. (
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be desirable to set up in London some interdepartmental mechanism
Cound. be taken
revented posim
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to examine in advance what measures (we might take] to make
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sebound
confrontation reset against Chinese interests.
The Effect of China's Attitude on Policy in Hong Kong
Should
45. The lesson of the 1967 controntation is that we [need to show
firmly and resolutely it is our intention to hold our position in
Hong Kong; to do otherwise would convey to the Chinese the
impression that Hong Kong is a ripe plum which will fall into
lap their [hands at the slightest disturbance of the tree. On the
other hand, since China has the power at any time either to take
over Hong Kong physically by military action or to reduce the
Hong Kong Government to impotence by a planned and properly
directed campaign of disorder and violence, but is prepared
for the moment in her own interests not to do so; and since
such toleration of a colony on her doorstep is something of
an embarrassment from the ideological and nationalistic
viewpoint, it is always necessary for the Hong Kong Government
to maintain a balance between the necessity to preserve its
own authority in Hong Kong and the need not to antagonise
China to such an extent that the latter is driven to change
her policy of tacit acceptance of the status quo. So far
this balance has been achieved with remarkable success.
Effect of the approach of 1997
46. Quite apart from the possibilities discussed in the
preceding paragraphs of the Chinese seeking to eject us from
Hong Kong before 1997, the very existence of a date on which
/the
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