TNAG-0122-FCO40-158-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 105

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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L'almust'

This is the only

contingency

See as a

possibility

nor

undef

bank

mint

course, bear in mind that the Chinese communist concept of

"negotiations" is very different from ours and we cannot

hope to put our meaning on this word; in their eyes a

"negotiation" is the process by which their demands, once

presented, are uncompromisingly pursued until the opposition

is worn down into accepting them by a combination of

persistance, psychological pressures and even physical

threats.

38.

It is inconceivable that any communist Chinese government would "negotiate" an extension of the Hong Kong lease.

extremely unlikely that a Chinese government of any complexion

would be prepared to do although there is a remote

possibility that by 1997 (when the lease expires), there

might be a government in Peking which would be prepared to

acquiesce in, an extension of the status quo without any formal

re-negotiation of the lease. If we had a Chinse government

so reasonably inclined there might well be little need for us

wou there

to stay since it [could indicate the

kind of government to

which we could conscientiously hand over.

39. The considerations likely to influence the Chinese in a

decision either to take over, the Colony or to maintain the

status quo are set out below:-

Amendi.

below

(a) Towards a take-over

(i) National feeling: this might move naturally

against foreign occupation of parts of Chinese

more likely

territory or it could be stimulated for internal

reasons (e.g. internal political strife) to focus

attention on an external issue with highly emotional

or nationalistic overtones.

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/(ii)

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