TNAG-0121-FCO40-157-Kowloon-walled-city-and-adjoining-areas-1970 — Page 55

Reference...

Flags F, D

and C

However, while limited action on the scale contemplated must carry a risk (and the communists will certainly "criticise"), I see no firm ground on which to dissent from the Hong Kong conclusion that it will not lead to a major rumpus.

7. When we replied to the Chinese protest in 1963 see (20) and (39) on 63/65 papers - we offered, in the particular context of the development plan we then tried to implement, to hold discussions with the Chinese Government "to dispel their concern". We had no reply. I see no future in repeating such an offer at least, not so soon after the recent happenings in Macao and Hong Kong. It would be unnecessary so far as the current development plans are concerned; and, in the case of action against the schools, dangerous if not counter-productive. But I think that, if ever the circumstances envisaged in paragraph 5 of Mr. Maddocks' letter were to arise, we might need to consider whether Chinese acquiescence should be sought through covert channels.

I see these circumstances as not so much offering

the opportunity" to intervene on a greater scale (which is how Mr. Maddocks expresses it) as presenting a challenge which Hong Kong would have to accept if it is not to be seen to be deliberately waiving its authority. In such a situation, unless views in Hong Kong and Peking have changed substantially from those recorded in the exchanges at (86), (95) and (96) on 63/65 papers or the climate of our relations with China has greatly improved, it would seem a necessary cautionary measure to prepare the ground with the Chinese Government before embarking on any brave new measures.

8. I suggest that the reply to Mr. Maddocks might be on the following lines :

(a) We agree with the conclusion that the "Nunnery

Site" Development Plan, as it is to be

implemented, should present only a small risk of adverse communist reaction.

(b) We are puzzled that, in selecting one sector in which to extend the exercise of Government authority, they should have chosen the educational sector where communist sensitivity is likely to be most marked. We might agree that the grounds for so proceeding are strong but express the view that we do not think this will necessarily prevent violent communist criticism or even a formal C.P.G. reaction. We should stress that action to ensure observance

of fire protection requirements in schools should be plainly seen to be non-discriminatory, preferably starting off by making an example of one or two independent schools without communist connections (if there are such).

(c)

Finally we might say that, although the

circumstances envisaged in paragraph 5 of his letter might indeed present an opportunity to intervene in the affairs of the city on a greater scale, any sudden stepping up of the scale of intervention would risk the danger of the Chinese Government again formally re-stating its position in strong terms. It might there- fore be advisable to consider, in the climate of relations then prevailing, whether there are

/ any means