foreign policies it might from time to time prefer, was also
bound profoundly to affect the position of the United Kingdom
as a world power. Dependent on its own territory only, and on
the forces which that territory could afford to maintain,
Britain clearly could not continue for very long to sustain the
sort of military presence far from its own shores which was
practicable in the days of a united Empire.
6. The withdrawal by the end of 1971 of all permanent British
garrisons East of Suez (excepting Hong Kong), which came when
announced last year as such a shock to many, should, perhaps,
have been anticipated much sooner. Quite apart from the balance
of payments difficulties which were decisive in forcing that
decision other factors might have caused some British contraction
of world-wide military commitments to be expected. After all
when in 1947 and 1948 India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon all
became independent, and when in 1954 we agreed to withdraw our
forces from the Suez Canal, the old foundations of our power
East of Suez had already largely disappeared.
7. That our withdrawal from permanent bases distant from our
home shores should be taking place at the end of the sixties
and the beginning of the seventies rather than 20 years earlier
has at least had the advantage that it has been delayed until
the countries East of Suez which have become independent since
the last war have had time to become well established before
having themselves to face the problems of providing for the
security of the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and South-East
Asia without the support of a permanent British military
presence there.
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