TNAG-0114-FCO40-150-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 57

and the desirability of influencing any broad

doalatona by the Chinese on relations after

Groy's rolcase argue in favour of our taking

an car y opportunity to sponk as you suggest,

But the disadvantages could be considerable: the stated basis for the release of Grey (which at present has a look of atability) might well

be called in question by a message which the

Chinese might choose to believe heralded &

change of line on our side; also the chances (slim though they are) of any spontaneous

relcase of other British subjects after the

#

release of Grey would almost certainly be

destroyed. On balance therefore we favour

silence for the time being.

7. Meanwhile it goes without saying that we

must continue to avoid anything which could

give substance to the idea that there are

differencca of view on "concossions" between

the Government of Hong Kong and HMO. To make

a statement to the Chinese, whether formal or

informal, to the effect that no such differ-

ences exist could, we believ, only confirm

them in the suspicion. Short of this however

we shall rodouble our efforts to counter any

misapprehension among the public or press here

that there are any differenc o whatsoever

between us over the handling of the Grey case

or other aspects of relations with the

Chinese Government,