TNAG-0113-FCO40-149-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 159

7.

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) In that we should be insisting on the prisoners

serving all but two months of their normal

sentences with remission, we could fairly easily

rebut charges of flabbiness in the face of Chinese

pressure,

There are, however, strong arguments against it:-

(a) Since we have taken a firm stand in Hong Kong on

the principle of non-interference with the judicial

processes, it might be undesirable to compromise

that principle simply to settle the Grey affair

two months earlier.

(b)

So far from seeing our act as a gesture of compromise

the Chinese might take it simply as proof that we were in the final instance susceptible to pressure and

that by hanging on to Mr. Grey beyond September,

they might bring us to further concessions in the

matter of other convicted prisonera. I do not

think this risk is great, but regard it as by no

means negligible.

(c) We should face the old difficulty of being asked

by critics here and an tiong Kong about any measures

we had taken to ensure that our gesture would in

fact result in the release of Mr. Grey.

(a) We should have to contend with tiresome criticism

as indeed we could

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along the lines that if a

gesture of clemency were possible in July, why

could we not have spared Mr. Grey suffering by

making the gesture in January.

CONFIDENTIAL

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