TNAG-0113-FCO40-149-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 136

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b)

c)

confidence in the security situation to regard the

risks of release negligible. But it is not so much the immediate security situation that concerns the Governor as long-term confidence. Any action which might lead the inhabitants of Hong Kong to conclude that we have lost our nerve could quickly be disastrous. we cannot afford to mis-calculate and must give due weight to the arguments of the Governor who is better placed than we are to make judgement. Admittedly the closer we get to the due release dates of the prisoners, the less their premature release will be a concession to

the Chinese and the less the danger.

By providing a precedent of willingness to disregard the courts in a flagrant manner and for a political purpose, premature release would impair the future credibility of the sanction of imprisonment. Admittedly there is a time element in this also, since a brief curtailment of imprisonment might not be very damaging in this respect. On the other hand since we have taken a fire stand in Hong Kong on the principle of non- interference with the judicial process it might be undesirable to compromise that principle simply in the hope of settling the Grey affair a matter of months

earlier.

Success in their ransom tactics could encourage the

Chinese to adopt similar tactics in future to the detriment of other British subjects. There have been

those who have argued that if the Chinese decided in future to take hostages they would do so whatever our action in this particular case. There is some force in this argument. But the Grey case is especially important in that it is the first, as far as I am aware, in which the Chinese have acknowledged the taking of a political hostage.

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