TNAG-0112-FCO40-148-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 90

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14. The arguments against the immediate or early release of the detainees are the overriding need to maintain the security of the

Colony and public confidence locally in the ability of the Hong Kong

Government to exercise its authority in the face of Chinese pressure.

In this connection it is important to avoid giving any impression

in Hong Kong that the interests of the Colony are being subordinated

in any way to those of general British relations with China. (But equally, the converse must be got across that reasonable Sino-British relations are in the interest of Hong Kong).

15. On their records the remaining detainees could still pose a

threat to the security of Hong Kong, if released. They are known

activitists and militants; four of them come from difficult areas

in the New Territories. While we know that the C.P.G. issued

directions for the cessation of violent and militant activities,

there cannot yet be any certainty that the local communist leadership

in Hong Kong retains the power to enforce this directive on the rank and file of its supporters. Whatever the merits therefore of the release of detainees and the revocation of emergency powers as measures of "de-escalation", we must, I consider, accept the Governor's views on the danger to security of releasing these particular people at the present time. He would be in a very

vulnerable position if any of those released were to cause further trouble. The great weight of public opinion in Hong Kong, as reflected in the Colony's independent Chinese newspapers, supports the view that detainees should not be released if they are thought

to constitute a threat to security. The dramatic gesture of emptying the detention centre by the release of all the remaining detainees would, if it miscarried, damage public confidence and would

undoubtedly be represented by sections of public opinion as a

premature concession to Chinese pressure or to a misguided view of

British interests.

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