4. As to paragraph 3 (i) above, comparison may usefully be made with the War-time Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 of the United King- dom which at least required the Secretary of State to have reasonable cause for believing that a person was of "hostile origin or associations or to have been concerned in acts pre- judicial to the public safety etc.
before he could
exercise his powers thereunder. In Hong Kong, the only limitation upon the Colonial Secretary's powers under Regulation 31 appears to be in the enabling Ordinance, Chapter 241, itself, section section 2 of which empowers the Governor in Council to make regulations which may be "de- sirable in the public interest". In effect this means that any limitation upon the Colonial Secretary's powers under Regulation 31 is self-imposed.
5. As to paragraph (ii) above, comparison may use- fully be made with Regulation 18B(5) in the United Kingdom which provides that the chairman of an Advisory Committee constituted to hear objections to orders made under Regula- tion 18B must inform the objector of the grounds on which an order has been made and must further furnish the objector with such particulars as may be sufficient to enable the objector to present his case. An example of the degree of particularity is afforded in the case of Stuart v. Anderson (1941) 2 A.E.R. at page 672 where the notice of detention reads as follows:-
"The order under defence reg. 18B was made against you, John Roland Smeaton Stuart for the following reasons: (1) The Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe that you have been a member of the organisation now known as British Union; and that it is necessary to exercise control
over you.
Particulars. You, John Roland
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