4[sic]. course (a):
(a)
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As seen from here, balance is strongly in fav
r of
Release would secure Grey's freedom. We may now be sure of that. Conversly failure to release means continued detention, with very serious risks to his health.
(b) Contact would be a major contribution to a detente in Sino-British relations affecting other British subjects as well even ir Grey did not exist it is the kind of move we should be considering at this time. he shall not get back to a tolerable level of relations until we clear away the debris of confrontation by releasing all detainees and at least some convicted prisoners.
(c) It is not a conclusive argument against this course to say we would be giving way to Chinese pressure. Any settlement means concessions, Certainly, the Chinese terms are extravagant. But if we are to maintain a presence here we shall have to live with terms of this kind. Progress in de- escalation since 1967 has been by a series of mutual concessions. If we had not made them this mission for example would still have been confined to its quarters as in the Autumn of 1967.
(a) kelease of News workers at this interval from 1967 troubles and when great majority of confrontation prisoners have served their full terms would not be an act of weakness. Although it is not for me to judge, there seems a good prospect that it would be readily understood by public opinion in Hong Kong, as in United Kingdom, as a humanitarian gesture.
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(e) As an act of clemency it would admittedly mean interferring with normal process of justice. But we have for some time envisaged this possibility in case of Lo and have intimated to Chinese that earlier release of a convicted prisoner was not out of the question (Hong Kong telegrams Nos. 2001 and 2007).
(F) I am not convinced that release would significantly encourage the Chincse in further hostage-taking, The fact is that they have taken hostages already and unless we pay we shall not' obtain their release. Our policy of no concessions prisoners hitherto has brought no obvious benefits.
As regards the future, if there were another crisis, the Chinese would again take hostages, whatever we do in this instance. Marginally there may be some encouragement if they get their News workers but terms of imprisonment the latter have served and adverse publicity over Grey should be a disincentive.
5. As regards course (b), this is scarcely a true alternative. Having gone on public record the Chinese are not going to back down. If we are prepared to interfere with the course of justice in say 6 months or a year's time, when Grey's health may have collapsed, the case is surely decisive for doing so now.
6.
Course (c) would avoid interference with normal course of justice, but at great cost. It would mean acceptance of another 2 year confinement for Grey. During this period there will no doubt
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