TNAG-0111-FCO40-147-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 117

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the wording of the report carefully voids committing the ChinesO

Governsent to any auch position. As suggested in my submission

of 3 January, there are good grounds for regering it as a

defensive response to our recently publicity compaign. (1 return

to this point below.) Nor can we be cart in that the Chinese

have said their last word about their price. The NCNA statement

could represent a maximum bargaining position; on the other

hand we do not know with absciute certainty that, were the

elever reasining news workare released, Chinese demands would end

there. 11 we aan et te with certainty is that the NCHA statement

hum somewhat narrowed the area of mɔnoeuvre which the Chinese

permit themselves.

(3) Paragreth 2

acnette

(1) It may be groed

r. Cradock conceder, while

NORA

trying to avoid doing so, that the NCNA statement is not clear-cut

nd that it does not provide a guarantee that were the news

workers released we should secure the rolesse of Er. Grey.

(11) "By local standarda zessage is in very large letters":

This is a matter of opinion. Valike Fr. Cradock, se believe

that the HONA attement does contin ooniderable defensive

element. It echoes precisely recent statements by Communist

leaders in Hong Kong who have attempted to defuse the publicity

campaign about Fr. Grey by throwing the moral burden for hie

Aetention bok on H.V.G. Their argument has run

How can you

attack us for holding Grey while you are holding thirteen now

2

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