TNAG-0104-FCO40-140-Discussions-with-Governor-during-his-visits-to-UK-1969 — Page 84

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Detainees were being released at present at a slightly higher than safe rate having regard to security considerations.

5. The Governor considered that the Chinese probably did appreciate the difference (for us) between detainees and prisoners serving sentences of imprisonment for convictions on criminal charges and that it was much easier for us to release the former than the latter. The bulk of the prisoners convicted of offences during confrontation had already served their sentences and had been released. Approximately 500 such prisoners were still in custody and this number yould probably be halved by the end of the year. Any indication that we were prepared to release convicted prisoners prematurely would lead to dangerous pressures on us.

6. It was agreed that in deciding on the release of detainees security considerations in Hong Kong must remain a paramount consideration. However, such releases could and should make a

the rate of contribution to a general process of de-escalation; release should to some extent be determined by any further Chinese conciliatory gestures which were bound to reduce tension and improve the security situation in the Colony. There was general agreement that it would be unwise to make concessions in the field of convicted prisoners with the reservation that it might be necessary to give further consideration to this in a limited context if present hopes of the release of Mr. Grey were not realised (see paragraph 9 below).

(a) Grey

The Governor said that he would like to correct certain misapprehensions which appeared to exist over this matter. Although the Chinese had held Mr. Groy under house arrest in Peking in retaliation for the arrest of a New China News Agency correspondent (Hsueh) in Hong Kong, they had taken this action against Mr. Grey on a tit for tat basis and not on a personal basis. It did not necessarily follow, therefore, that if Hsueh (and/or Lo) were released, the Chinese would automatically release Mr. Grey. In fact, the Chinese intermediary through whom a covert probe had been conducted into the intentions of the Peking authorities had told us that there was no price for Grey and had advised against the premature release of Hsueh. In doing so he had stated that such a course might well make difficulty for the future (i.e., it might cause the Chinese to grab additional British hostages as bargaining counters), and it would also embarrass those Chinese who were working in Peking for a moderate approach to this problem. It was primarily for the latter reason that the Governor was strongly recommending that matters should be allowed to take their course, and that the release of Hsueh with full remission on 16 November should bo awaited in the hope that this would result in Mr. Grey's own release. Although it would probably be overstating the case to describe the Chinese intermediary as "reliable" he was certainly well informed albeit extremely devious.

If

8. It was agreed to await the outcome of Hsueh's release. Mr. Grey had not been released by early December it would be

The first step might necessary to review the whole situation.

By that time be to make a further probe of Chinese intentions. Ministers would certainly be under considerable pressure here, either to take some form of retaliatory action or for a major

In these circumstances concession to be granted in Hong Kong. it would be desirable to have a further discussion with the Governor before he returned to Hong Kong at the middle of December.

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