TNAG-0100-FCO40-136-Hong-Kong-royal-visits-1968 — Page 67

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I am not here, of of security as such. I am trying to asees or would not, wis. my own personal v Nevertheless, the

course, at all concerned with the problems

A11 These are the Governor's business.

is whether the Chinese Government would, o make trouble. As I have implied above, is that the likelihood is not very great. are one or two small things that might be done to reduce the .isk further, e.g.

(a)

it might

it might be prudent to make the public announcement of the viit as late as possible, in order to reduce the peric. of time during which things could go wrong. I feel we that we should not consult the Chinese about before-hand, nor even tip them off informally immediately before the official announcement is made;

(b) we do not want a row just before the visit, so it would be better if no American aircraft carriers or large ships engaged in the Viet-Nam war, visited Hong Kong during the period (one or two months?) immediately prior to the visit; and there should, if possible, be no American warships at all in Hong Kong during the visit; and

(c)

it would look better if the visit formed part of a tour of the area including visits to other countries (presumably a wide berth would be given to Formosa even for refuelling purposes!)

5, I should emphasise that I am in no position to guarantee that the Chinese will not make trouble; but my own feeling is that in present circumstances, the risk is not big enough to be allowed to stop the visit. If circumstances changed between now and the date of the official announcement, then we should all have to think again.

your

eve

Donald

(D. C. Hopson)

CONFIDENTIAL