TNAG-0099-FCO40-135-Visit-by-Secretary-of-State-1967 — Page 35

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

Extract

ar

HWA

10/9

CONFIDENTIAL

outright attack, it was nevertheless necessary.

It was impossible to separate internal security

from external defence because a breakdown in

internal security would invite external inter-

vention. There had been some erosion of

confidence in the U.K. because of a number of

issues such as the dockyard lands, and some growth

in the feeling that Britain no longer really cared

about Hong Kong. That was why he was opposed to

any reduction in the garrison at the present time.

The Garrison

3.

The Commander British Forces said that

some gunners and armour were necessary as part of

the confidence trick to show our determination to

resist and expose aggression. If trouble came

it was likely to be a combination of external sabre

rattling and internal agitation as had recently

happened in Macao. The proposed reduction to

5.2/3 major units would mean the Gunner Regiment

leaving. They had offered other economies instead,

for example the Gurkha Engineers unit, but they had

been told that Hong Kong was the only place where

it could be kept. They accepted this but had put

forward an alternative proposal to the C.D.S.,

namely that they should keep one R.A. battery in

return for giving up the Pack Transport Squadron.

It had been argued that the Pack Transport Squadron

was not a teeth arm unit; but it would nevertheless

secure savings in foreign exchange. They understood

that the C.D.S. favoured the retention of one R.A.

battery and they sought the Secretary of State's

support for this. The Secretary of State undertook

to look into it on return and repeated that no

decision had yet been taken on the timing of the

proposed withdrawal of one major unit.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4.

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