peace" (see per May, L. C.J. in Seymour v. Davitt (1882) 15 Cox c.c.
242, 250) or to the justices of the peace when carrying out their
peace preservation duties. We trust that it is not seriously
contemplated that they should be dependent upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Essential Services or of any other functionary of
the Executive for leave to perform their duties. We are opposed
to their being required to have any warrant beyond their letters
patent or warrant of appointment, which would seem to be not less
authoriatative than, say, a fireman's Identity Card. If any furthe:
warrant is really required it should, we suggest, be under the
hand of the Chief Justice.
Section 32.
39 It is manifest that wide powers are essential to
control the possession of weapons during times of civil unrest and
we accept that such control must extend to all premises. However,
even if, as we think it must be, the definition of "offensive
weapon" is amended we suggest that the section is lacking in
necessary safeguards. While possession necessarily imports know-
ledge, carrying does not. In England it was necessary to obtain a
decision of the court that the words "has with him in any public
place"in s.1 of the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953 meant "knowingly
has with him in a public place" (Reg. v Cugullere (1961) 45 Cr.
App.R. 108). Would it not be wise to insert the word "knowingly"
in this Ordinance to prevent the possibility of argument that
that decision is not applicable to the slightly different working?
40 Although "without lawful authority" is defined for
the purposes of s.14 it is not defined for the purposes of this
section and it is not very clear what is intended, more specially
since possession for domestic purposes is implicity without
lawful authority: see sub-section (2). Should it not be "without
lawful authority and excus e"? A person might have a firearms
licence which would be lawful authority to have a firearm in his
15.
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