TNAG-0081-FCO40-117-Public-Order-legislation-1968 — Page 25

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meant to cover Part III and Part IV unlawful assemblies.

I intend to suggest that the whole of section 28 be repealed in view of the fact that a person who takes part in an intimidating assembly can be prosecuted for taking part in an unlawful assembly.

Paragraph 36. The repeal of section 28 would also mean the repeal

of section 30.

Paragraphs 37-38. The comment on the cancellation of a curfew permit has theoretical force, though it is unlikely to arise often in practice, since few permits need to be issued to individuals, in view of the fairly extensive exemptions provided by subsection (6) of section 31. However, it would be

possible to oblige the Commissioner to give notice of cancellation under 31(2)(b).

I do not think that it is necessary to exempt J.Ps. from curfew orders. They have no duties to perform during curfews, since courts cannot

function at such times.

Paragraphs 39 to 41. It seems likely that the courts would follow

R. v. Cuguellere. However, I would not oppose inserting "knowingly" in section 32(1). It would, I think, be better to add "or reasonable excuse", after "lawful authority" in section 32(1), to accord with the same phrase used

in section 33.

I see no reason to remove the reference to domestic purposes in subsection (2). These are merely examples of what is regarded as "lawful authority or reasonable excuse" under section 32(1) (as amended). There is force in the criticism about tools, which would be covered by the amendment.

Paragraph 42. A closed area order does need to be published, in accordance with section 20(a) of the Interpretation and General Clauses

Ordinance.

Section 37 could be amended to provide for reasonable notice. Paragraph 43. I agree.

Paragraph 44. I think that special constables would be within the definition of public servant in the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance.

Paragraph 45. I think the phrase used in the Ordinance is the more

modern usage.

Paragraphs 46 to 50. The section, though long part of Hong Kong law, would benefit from some tidying up.

Paragraphs 51 to 52. The power in section 49(1)(a) only arises in relation to things which appear to the police officer to be likely to be, or

contain, evidence of an offence. However, I can see no objection to adding a requirement of reasonable grounds for suspicion.

The power to enter should be limited to offences created by the