TNAG-0081-FCO40-117-Public-Order-legislation-1968 — Page 141

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peace" (see per May, L. C.J. in Seymour v. Davitt (1882) 15 Cox c.c. 242, 250) or to the justices of the peace when carrying out their

peace preservation duties. We trust that it is not seriously

contemplated that they should be dependent upon the warrant of the

Commissioner of Essential Services or of any other functionary of

the Executive for leave to perform their duties. We are opposed

to their being required to have any warrant beyond their letters

patent or warrant of appointment, which would seem to be not less

authoriatative than, say, a fireman's Identity Card. If any furthe:

warrant is really required it should, we suggest, be under the

hand of the Chief Justice.

Section 32.

It is manifest that wide powers are essential to

control the possession of weapons during times of civil unrest and

we accept that such control must extend to all premises. However,

even if, as we think it must be, the definition of "offensive

weapon" is amended we suggest that the section is lacking in

necessary safeguards. While possession necessarily imports know-

ledge, carrying does not. In England it was necessary to obtain a decision of the court that the words "has with him in any public place"in s.l of the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953 meant "knowingly has with him in a public place" (Reg. v Cugullere (1961) 45 Cr. App.R. 108). Would it not be wise to insert the word "knowingly" in this Ordinance to prevent the possibility of argument that that decision is not applicable to the slightly different working?

Although "without lawful authority" is defined for

the purposes of s.14 it is not defined for the purposes of this section and it is not very clear what is intended, more specially

since possession for domestic purposes is implicity without

lawful authority: see sub-section (2). Should it not be "without

lawful authority and excuse"? A person might have a firearms

licence which would be lawful authority to have a firearm in his

15.