TNAG-0081-FCO40-117-Public-Order-legislation-1968 — Page 139

៩

as criminal.

(iii) paragraph (b) is so wide that it cannot avoid making

criminals of many persons who would not normally be regarded

Every person who issue a writ and who is sub-

sequently held to have had no good cause of action would

appear to be guilty of an offence. It might be at least

understandable if the section had read "which to his knowledg

such other person is not legally obliged to do" but we

submit that it cannot be allowed to stand in its present form

Section 28

Here again "unlawful assembly" has not been confined

to assemblies which are unlawful by virtue of Part IV of the

Our observations (i) and (ii) upon s.27 apply equally

Ordinance.

to this section.

t

It is an alarming feature of the section that the

entire assembly, whatever its size, may become an intimidating

assembly solely by virtue of the act of one individual in it

without participation in that act by the other members of the

assembly and even without their knowing of it. As the penalties

for membership of an intimidating assembly are no greater than

those for membership of an unlawful assembly this would not produce

any serious injustice to the mere members of the assembly, but it

produces a possibility of the grossest injustice to the organizers

of the assembly by reason of the inter-action of this section and

s.30. This injustice will be referred to in more detail in our

comment s on s.30 and here we say no more than that we think only

such persons in the unlawful assembly as speak or otherwise behave

manner should be an intimidating

in an intimidating assembly. It follows that in our view more

than one person should be guilty of such speach or behaviour before

there can be an intimidating assembly.

We are unable to understand the purpose of making

13.