TNAG-0081-FCO40-117-Public-Order-legislation-1968 — Page 128

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provocative) subject and we recognise that in some or all of the

sections to which we refer it may have been the intention to import

mens rea and that the courts would rule that mens rea was required

in accordance with the general rule. Nevertheless there have been occasions (see Kwan Yiu Wing v. Rog. Criminal appeal No.258 of 1966 and the cases there cited) where crimes of strict liability have

been created. In such an uncertain field as that of public order

we submit that it is desirable to close the door to doubt rather

than to run the risk of exacerbating discontent by convictions

based on an incorrect view of the law. Our comments should be read

in the light of this view.

Section 2

"Meeting". This definition is so wide that it will

catch many unexpected kinds of fish. Even when meetings exclusively for the purposes of public bodies (which are defined in the Inter- pretation and General Clauses Ord.) are disregarded the definition

covers gatherings in courts of law, meetings of creditors (if held in a public place), funerals and (possibly) gatherings to pay

respects to the dead. Whatever else may be done to limit the definition the words "or any court of law" should be added at the

end of it. Funerals will be referred to more specifically under

s.7.

"Offensive weapon" Experience has shown the difficulty of producing a definition which does not leave gaps for the escape

of obviously wicked persons. Nevertheless a line must be drawn

when there is a possibility that nearly every member of the

community is in danger of committing an offence. It is one thing

to include articles "made or adapted" for use for causing in-jury and articles "intended for" such use but quite another to include articles "suitable for" causing injury. It has been pointed out in

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