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6. It has been made clear to us that the C.P.G regard legal action against the three papers they own in Hong Kong as acts of extreme provocation against themselves. In discussions with our Charge in Peking they have specifically referred to one of the actions noted in paragraph 3 above as being an obstacle to a return to normal Sino-British relations. Communist newspapers in Hong Kong have warned the Hong Kong Government that litigation against them will meet with "escalated counter attacks", have said that damages will not be paid and have prophesied that the Hong Kong authorities will not pursue such litigation because they are frightened of the consequences.
Argument
7.
As a result of consultation with Peking and the Governor three possible courses emerge :·
A.
B.
C.
A conclusion of the matter this week, as proposed in paragraph 5 above,i.e. abandonment of the action.
A date to be applied for in March for damages to be assessed.
The matter to be left in the air, with no further action at present contemplated.
8.
Our Charge in Peking strongly favours abandonment (course A) on the grounds that attempts to enforce judgment against the paper would provoke a crisis (Peking tels. Nos. 23 and 28).
He does not favour a course which would result in the possibility of such actions being held as a sword of Damocles over the heads of the newspapers, because "the sword would hang not only over the Ta Kung Pao but also over Sino-British relations".
9. The Governor has stated that he is inclined to favour course C (Hong Kong tel. No. 34). He has argued that to hold the sword over the heads of the newspapers (course B or C) may act to some extent as a surety of better behaviour on their part (Hong Kong tel. No. 27), but he has pointed out that it may be difficult to persuade the plaintiff to adopt course C rather than course A, since the latter is tired of the action and is anxious to have done with it.
10.
There is no doubt that to pursue action against the newspaper to the point of insisting on damages (involving, as seemsinevitable, action by way of distraint) would provoke a crisis. There seems little advantage therefore in prolonging the proceedings any longer than is necessary, particularly since it is very much open to doubt whether prolongation would serve as a brake on the Communist press. They have in fact publicly expressed disbelief that the action taken against them would be pursued to completion. The present general improvement in relations vis-a-vis Peking, in the attitude of the local Communist press and in the internal situation in Hong Kong offers us an opportunity of abandoning a course which we should in any event be most reluctant to follow unless the alternative was to accept a definite erosion of our authority in the Colony. Indeed to abandon the course now could lead to a further improvement in the general situation. And we have always to bear in mind the position of our Mission in Peking and of Mr. Grey, the Reuters' correspondent there.
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