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para 5 (a)
para 5 (b)
para 5 (c)
para 5 (a)
para 5 (e)
para 6
figures are only a very rough guess and apply to non-C.P.G. owned papers. Closure of C.P.G. owned papers would probably result in a much bigger switch. This is an argument for closing non-C.P.G. papers thus reducing the number of people in receipt of communist propaganda.
the effectiveness of other media is by no means as great and it would not reach the same number of people (distribution problems).
this is a possibility which has to be faced whenever any form of action is taken.
C
this is true but there never seems to be a time when the situation is not "particularly delicate". While it is possible local radio stations could be jammed, this type of action could only be undert taken with C.P.G. consent and would represent a major escalation by C.P.G.
violence will continue evon if the papers are not closed. If they are permitted to remain in circulation then, as previously stated, the communists will retain their main media for dissemination of instructions and encouragement of violence.
any increase in violence resulting from closure of the newspapers would only be short-tera closure would be effective for 6 months. Therefore long- term effect more beneficial.
Deductions
(a)
still very effective as evidenced by waves of violence following articles published in press.
(b)
use of other media would not be anywhere near as effective.
(a)
agreed one of the rais arguments for action.
(e)
agreed but must risk this if we are to contain subversive threat.
Conclusions
(a)
(b)
not now decreasing and may increase in future. The suppressed newspapers will re-open in February and increase circulation figures of communist press.
M
not entirely true arrested "bombers" have stated they follow line advocated in press.
(c)
only in the very short-tera probably beneficial.
*
longer-term effect
(a)
re-appraisal of 9/11 more applicable.
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