TNAG-0077-FCO40-113-Action-against-Communist-press-1967 — Page 204

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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3. We have considered various new measures to deal with the situation. These include:-

(i) picking up and if possible deporting, and

failing that detaining, a selection (e.g. up to 24) of the known leaders of the present campaign;

(ii)

(iii)

action to neutralize several of the buildings from which the campaign is being directed, notably (i) the Bank of China and (ii) the communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union

This might Head Quarters and the Workers' Club.

be achieved by declaring 24 hour curfews in areas around the buildings, or possibly declaring them closed areas under the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245);

action against the principal communist newspaper "Wen Wei Po" the official C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong, for either sedition or inciting police to disaffection;

(iv) bring commando ship BULWARK on a visit to

Hong Kong.

4. Each of foregoing actions would entail certain amount of risk of escalation, and possible complications with Peking. We face a dilemma, in that:-

(a) we obviously wish so far as possible to avoid

action which could lead to more C.P.G. involvement (and there is some evidence C.P.G. themselves wish to

avoid this); but

(b) holding the situation here requires that Government

should retain the initiative.

Since (b) is imperative, we must be prepared to face some risk under (a). On this basis pros and cons of various courses in paragraph 3 above, as we see them are as follows:

Course (i)

5. The disruption of leadership would be a distinct

It would and positive gain, at least in the short term.

But since it be seen by our friends here as firm action. is unlikely that China would accept persons concerned as deportees, the probability is that they would have to be detained indefinitely in Hong Kong. This would provide local communists and Peking with a standing grievance, and would inevitably lead to creation of a further "demand".

Course (ii)

6. This would seriously hamper the communist leadership in their control and development of anti-Government operations. For a while they would be bottled up in their existing Headquarters, cut off from outside contacts.

At very least

/it

SECRET

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