TNAG-0070-FCO40-106-Disturbances-in-Hong-Kong-propaganda-1968 — Page 61

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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CONFIDENTIAL

7.

At the same time as they are made to realize the exact nature of the threat as it is now merging Government officers should realize our own objective which takes into account the reality of the Chinese Communists' presence. This is a subtle and difficult situation and the exploitation of public information for maintenance of public confidence and public support in this situation calls for a greater effort and greater understanding than ever before.

8.

In the first phrase of violent confrontation our propaganda has been largely a response to Communist actions and these actions thom- selves have been so unpopular that the public could easily be persuaded to reject them. The other factor in the first stage was the simple but, in Hong Kong, the over-riding question 'Are the authorities physically strong enough to deal with the Communists?' Fortunately the Police left

no doubt this as the Communists have openly recognised.

9.

In the second phrase of 'underground' confrontation there will be no such simple issues, no such easy appeal and no such easy demonstration of Government's ability to win. We shall have to prove everything as we go along. We are not in the habit of doing this. As far as public information is concerned we are rather in the habit of assuming that reasonable people would appreciate what we have done and if people do not appreciate the Government for its undoubted achievements on their behalf it is because they are either stupid or malicious. Therefore we have to spend a lot of effort showing how progressive our policies are and making people appreciative of them.

10.

There are high expectations about further progress. To some extent this is a very fortunate situation (as the Communist would say) for the Hong Kong Government. Although they could have done it the Communists have not yet campaigned in the fields where there is an obvious need for further progress although they may do so at any minute, In other words they have not taken up our options before we are ready to do

So.

We are still therefore in a position to claim all the credit although we may not be in tha fortunate position much longer. To quite a large extent this is not a matter of making vast and hasty changes in policy but of exploiting our present intentions or changing them slightly so that they can seem to fit in with popular expectation to a greater extent. Presentation is the key to the whole thing. Confidence and loyalty are Lnotemotional and/logical things and can be encouraged emotionally but not

logically. The excessive application of logic is more likely to dismay.

11.

The basis for this paper is the assumption that the various facilities and methods hitherto employed in public information work are not sufficient in themselves for a positive and effective programme of 'winning hearts and minds'. A public information programme with that broad objective will embrace very much more than the conventional methods currently available. It will employ, in addition, to the access to the press and the various other publicity techniques which the Informatiɔn Services has developed, every other possible means of communication with the public whether in small groups sharing particular and special interests or as a whole.

"ONFIDENTIAL

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