TNAG-0070-FCO40-106-Disturbances-in-Hong-Kong-propaganda-1968 — Page 59

[

CONFIDENTIAL

To those engaged in public information work it might well seem incredible at this late stage of events to have to justify a greater effort in this field. Since the Communists began in May their determined attempt to shake the basis of the Hong Kong Administration public information work of many kinds has been one of our main weapons. The very fact that today it is necessary once mɔre to build up an enthusiasm for public information work is to some extent a reflection of our success in that we have, as we meant to do, given people confidence that the Hong Kong Government and its security forces were capable of containing and limiting if not eliminating the Communist threat and that behind that protection life could return to normal.

2.

Throughout this period we have had occasion to recognize this fact and to recognize also that it can be at time dangerous. Other administrations in similar circumstances have met the same problem of maintaining public confidence simultaneously with public readiness to take firm and effective measures. This really involves two quite contradictory operations at the same time: one to minimse the threat and maximize confidence in the Government ability to deal with it and the second to prevent the public from becoming complacent, to persuade them to accept and support strong measures which they may even find inconvenient and distasteful by reminding them that the threat still exists.

3.

The dilemma is even more evident within the Government. As far as the public is concerned it is possible to risk quite a large degree of complacency if confidence is the more important objective. But all those branches of Government directly involved in meeting the Communist threat require the active appreciation and support of the rest of the Government which will not be available if they have any false or complacent feeling about the situation. This applies to the security forces who must continue to take measures which are inconvenient and perhaps also costly as well as to the information organization. There is good authority, on the basis of adequate experience in other similar situations, for recognizing that at this time an accelerated and expanded programme of public information is more rather than less necessary. It is also a time when the objectives of our programme will not be sɔ obvious as when the public can see clearly the confrontation between the forces of law and order and the mobs in the streets or the bomb throwers. If we are committed to anything we are now committed to a fierce battle for the hearts and minds of the population. We have to make as many people as possible conscious of, grateful for and lɔyal to this administration for the benefits it brings to them and which they are not willing to let go. We must make them appreciative of what the Government has done for them already, we must exploit to the full the things we are doing now and which we plan to do in the future and if for any reason we are unable to meet their expectations in any field we have to be convincing in our explanations

or excuses.

4.

Our confrontation with the Communists has shaken the assumption that Hong Kong can simply continue to promote its own prosperity with an indifferent China in the background. All of us who live here as well as those who do business with Hong Kong, are

CONFIDENTIAL