In the closed and maintain law and order was visible and credible. border area, under the throat raised by propaganda, it was not so easy to make our control equally credible. This was the purpose of the establi. ' ment of permanent staff to handle border information in close co-operatio with the Army. It has involved not only day-to-day information on the situation but the handling of information on many incidents which were very difficult from the propaganda point of view, including several abductions and the return of abducted people, occasions on which Government officials, police or soldiers have been held prisoner or lost weapons, and the incidents created at Man Kam To by Chinese Territory farmers or workers which have twice led to the closing of the bridge there.
36.
Until the Director of. Information Services found it necessary to withdraw the remaining officer from that post (para. y) the comparative relaxation on the border had made it possible to give greater emphasis to more general N.T.. propaganda in a more constructive vein. In this respect the unit is now working closely with the newly established Army Information Team.
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37.
To maintain contact at the policy level the officer in charge of the special publicity unit has regularly attended mectings of FAGENT, the Police, Army and Government Committee.
Folice.
38.
From the start the unit has regarded the police force as a prime concern. The presence of a senior police officer on the publicity committee and the posting of a very able experienced Chincue Folice pector to the unit, ha made it possible to support the police effectively with information material. The unit's own research has showi the extent to which the local communists recognise the police force to have been the main factor in the failure of their original tactic::. unit has given priority to propaganda about the police force and within the police force. This has included not only the normal type of information material but the arrangements or visits by legislative councillors, senior government officials and others to polico, formatione» and the widest publicity to these visits.
Strikes
Την
39.
In producing propaganda concerned with strikes, actual and autempted, the unit had the advantage of up-to-date intelligence through the publicity committee. The unit also developed its own research material on communist controlled unions, their structure and resourcer Anti-strike propaganda included the crude but ‹ffective effort against a projected bus strike which consisted lady of the Cu-tained broad-
of fracturi bfermati casting in Chinese at the time of a strik to counter communist appeals. upon the inability of the "tru, pay and the exploitation of the dia illa
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