3
SECRET
Seventeen members of the All Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, which had been formed as the ostensible spearhead of the agitation for acceptance of the "demands ", twice appeared outside the gates of Government House demanding, in an offensive and peremptory way, to see me. When this was refused, the temper of the demonstrators became hotter. The numbers of delegations quickly grew and their members became increasingly arrogant, demanding and noisy. Quantities of posters were affixed to the gate at the entrance to the Government House grounds. By 20 May, crowds of over 3,000 were involved and, being denied immediate access to Government House, spread out into the city creating trouble wherever they went, egged on by inflammatory and anti-European broadcasts over loud speakers from Communist-owned concerns particularly the Bank of China. The climax came on 22 May when a major trial of strength took place. Twice the crowds tried to break through the police. cordons round Government House and a well planned but poorly executed attempt. was made to dramatise police brutality by the manufacture of false victims and the maximum exploitation of real casualties. Elsewhere in the city dangerous crowds built up and traffic was brought to a standstill when bus drivers abandoned their vehicles blocking all the major roads, while there was renewed trouble in Kowloon. A night curfew was declared in the north of Hong Kong Island, and measures forbidding any public procession or meetings without police approval were brought into force. Order was restored and, with this, it could be said that the first violent phase of the confrontation with the Communists had ended. The police had behaved with exemplary restraint despite bearing the full brunt of Communist propaganda and being exposed over long periods to deliberate provocation. The total number of arrests had risen to 816. Casualties were now 35 police and 83 others injured, but there had been no further fatalities.
12.
The Foreign Secretary's strong protest to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires on 19 May had a most valuable impact on morale during this critical period, while the arrival of Sir Arthur Galsworthy, Mr. Bolland and Mr. Carter on 21 May served to emphasise Her Majesty's Government's complete support for a determination here to maintain law and order.
13.
Our own counter-propaganda at the time achieved considerable success in demonstrating the limited support on which the Communists would rely. The campaign to get individuals, institutions and communities to declare their support for law and order evoked a most heartening response, with well over 500 separate organisations eventually pledging their support to Government. So, too, did the Police Education Fund which rapidly built up to HK$3 million as a gesture of thanks to the police for their successful action in controlling disorder with the minimum of force. The countering of rumours, the encouragement of resistance to intimidation and the exposure of the more blatant Communist claims were also tackled successfully.
14. It must now have become clear to the Communist hierarchy here that they lacked the broad base of support from which to intimidate the Government. They had to keep the issue alive, but could not afford to alienate the Chinese majority who, despite their innate patriotism, had demonstrated their disinterest in-indeed, abhorrence for any forcible change in the status quo.
15. A new phase therefore opened on 23 May, when Communist tactics switched to the labour field and a series of token strikes began in all public transport and utility companies as well as in other concerns where Communist influence predominated. This policy was backed by intimidation and increasingly virulent propaganda in the local Communist Press, by posters and over mainland Chinese radio stations, the police still being the main object of attack. The stoppages were successful in that they succeeded in keeping the dispute before the eyes of the public without, however, inconveniencing anyone greatly or disrupting the life of the colony seriously. The policy could be said to be effective within its limited. scope, but it was essentially defensive in nature though it carried the threat of major strike action in the future.
16.
The battle is now one, on our part, to preserve public confidence in our ability to maintain control here (which is what all but a handful desperately hope we can do); and, on their part, to break this confidence down and persuade or terrorise sufficient numbers into compliance with their commands. Neither we nor the Communists have much freedom of manoeuvre. On our side, we cannot afford to provide a casus belli which would compel Peking to intervene
SECRET
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.