0003230 *G.F. 323
CONFIDENTIAL
པ ཉ་u།
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lavish payments by the communist unions, whose funds had been augmented by a contribution of $10 million from the All China Federation of Trade Unions. Despite wide-spread intimidation the answer to the strike call was patchy and the effect of the stoppages limited. Those companies or organisations that had been affected by stoppages arising from the display of posters had refused to re-engage or had dismissed the men responsible and they had no further trouble. The transport companies had the most absentees, but they managed to keep some services going; and the public contrived, with their usual resilience, to carry on much as usual. Some delays occurred in the working of ships because of intimidation of the crews of tugs and lighters but Hong Kong still continued to provide one of the fastest turn-round of ships in the world. The utility companies were fully able to operate effectively, while industry was barely affected.
7.
These stoppages were sheer political manoeuvres and bore no relation to legal strikes arising from industrial disputes. Accordingly, from the early days of the first stoppages Government servants and the employees of many private companies had been warned that if they took part they would be liable to disciplinary action. Emergency Regulations to protect workers against intimidation were promulgated. As a result of these measures loyal and neutral employces quickly returned to work.
8.
As a footnote to these events, the workers who were dismissed for walking out are still claiming 'strike pay' from their unions and it is believed that by the end of the year the communists had paid out more than $20 million in this way. By then communist unions were demanding that the Government should find employment for 10,000 men whom they alleged were unemployed or semi-employed. In fact it is thought that the great majority of the men concerned have since found other jobs. There are 4,000 vacancies in industry and another 1,000 vacancies in non-industrial occupations, which indicates clearly that anyone genuinely seeking work has a good chance of finding it.
9.
A further attempt to disrupt life in Hong Kong took the form of a four day food stoppage. At the end of June local communist importers refused to handle foodstuffs (mainly pigs and vegetables) arriving from China, though by an apparent lack of co-ordination some supplies continued to arrive at the border. There was a scarcity in Hong Kong and prices rose temporarily, but the public was not seriously affected.
10. By the beginning of July the idea of a general strike had been tacitly abandoned but efforts to paralyse the port persisted for many weeks. A boycott was called on 17th July combined with a stoppage of work by seamen. In spite of widespread intimidation and strenuous efforts by the communist Seamen's Union to make the stoppage effective, a steady flow of applicants for new berths continued; and although some men walked off ships arriving in the port they were replaced without difficulty. The boycott did have a sort of sour success in that Chinese fargoes awaiting transhipment in the port were held back by communist shipping agents, to nobody's real disadvantage except the owners. Foodstuffs continued to be brought in by river boats, although no cargo arrived from China in ocean-going ships. But the communists' claim that the port was at a standstill was not only quite without foundation but could be observed to be nonsensical by everyone in Hong Kong. During the period from May to December the tonnage of cargo discharged at the port was only 6% lower, and the tonnage of cargo loaded (which included Chinese transhipment cargoes) 35% lower, than the figures for the same period in the previous year.
11.
The period of relative calm that followed the collapse of the "general strike" was ended by an incident that took place at Sha Tau Kok on 8th July. Sha Tau Kok is a village that lies astride the land frontier
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CONFIDENTIAL
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