TNAG-0067-FCO40-103-Governors--reports-1968 — Page 42

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(FD 1/1)

R.318.

R&R. Ao

Dear Bunny,

CONFIDENTIAL

چیده میرا

N.. Camufara__

FOREIGN OFFICED IN

ES No. 63

8 March2MAR968

HAB 13/7

We might-how

consider the

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in reply. Fou

draft despatch in reply

Thank you for your letter HWB 13/7 of 28 February enclosing a copy of the Governor of Hong Kong's despatch No. 239 reporting the principal developments in the Colony since June last year.

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2. We think that the report is admirable. I agree with you that printing it with your reply should give the Governor any assurance he wanted that Ministers are aware that, although the danger of violence has apparently passed, the longer-term Chinese threat remains and we may expect local communists to work away to erode our position and try to create a "Macao- type" situation.

3. The account of the build-up of the communist campaign last year, the degree and manner of support from the Chinese Central Government, and in particular the way the incident of 8 July at Sha Tau Kok sparked off the subsequent campaign of violence confirm our view that the confrontation was an overspill of the Cultural Revolution in China which among other things resulted in a weakening of the channel of control to local Hong Kong communists. But for the admirably firm and patient policy of the Hong Kong Government, Peking might have been tempted or obliged to give full support to the local attempt to disturb the status quo and undermine authority.

4. We would not dissent from the Governor's conclusions in paragraph 35 about internal developments in China, but we doubt whether Mao and the extremists would be allowed by the more moderate elements and by the army to mount another campaign on the 1966/67 model, even if they wished to do so. The present disturbances, which continue in some areas of China, including Kwangtung Province, seem to be less violent than those which took place during last year, though they do suggest that it may be some considerable time before order and stabklity can be completely restored. They are not, however, likely to influence Chinese policy adversely from the Hong Kong point of view.

Yours ew.

James.

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W. S. Carter, Esq., C.V.O.,

Hong Kong Department,

Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(James Murray)