CONFIDENTIAL
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3.
I do not dissent from the conclusions in paragraph35
of your despatch concerning internal developments in
China, but my advisers and I doubt whether Mao Tse-tung
and the extremists would be allowed by the more moderate eoples' Liberation
2
elements or by the Chinese Peoples Army to mount another
campaign similar to that of last year, even if they
1
wished to do so. The present disturbances in certain
though Considerable areas of China, including the Kwangtung Province.
seem
火
to be less violent than those which took place last
year; and although it may be some considerable time
before order and stability can be completely restored,
they appear unlikely to influence Chinese policy
adversely so far as Hong Kong is concerned.
4. However, the fact that, apart from isolated
incidents, the local Communists have now abandoned
the use of violence to achieve their ends in the Colony
misappriciousins.
must leave us under no illusions.
There is, perhaps, a
danger that the efficiency and effectiveness with which
the Communist challenge last year was met and overcome,
coupled with the remarkable resilience displayed by the
Hong Kong economy, may create the impression that the
danger is past and that our vigilance can be relaxed. I
wish to assure you that I and my ministerial colleagues,
to whom copies of this exchange of despatches are being
circulated, are under no illusions on the subject.
We are
fully alive to the fact that the Communist threat to
Hong Kong remains very real and will continue unabated,
albeit in a different form, and that there are no grounds
whatever for complacency on our part.
CONFIDENTIAL
15.
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