TNAG-0067-FCO40-103-Governors--reports-1968 — Page 26

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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CONFIDENTIAL

of the Gurkhas and some armoured vehicles of the Life Guards were called in to relieve the police, who by then had suffered five dead and eleven injured.

12. These events received wide publicity and attracted a number of alarmist and exaggerated reports in the overseas Press. It was a most serious and tragic incident, but it was not an attempt at an armed invasion of the Colony. The People's Liberation Army certainly did not take part, the affair being purely local: that is, it was organised by villagers in the border area; it was probably not co-ordinated with the activities of the urban Communists; and all the evidence suggests that it came as a complete surprise to the CPG.

13. This did not, however, prevent the Communist Press in Hong Kong from interpreting the incident as militant CPG support. Flagging Communist morale rose, and moderate counsels were overborne. For the next four days there was a succession of incidents, with militant Communist groups attacking trams and buses, ambushing police units, and generally looking for trouble. During this period one policeman and seven rioters lost their lives.

14. The 12 July marked a turning point in this phase and indeed in the whole campaign of confrontation. On that day the acting Colonial Secretary announced in the Legislative Council that the Government was determined to grasp and maintain the initiative, and pressure was at once put on the Communists. Strong parties of police, backed up by army units carrying out cordon duties, mounted a succession of raids against Communist centres, which included trade union premises, schools and department stores. In the course of these raids they seized a considerable quantity of home-made weapons and explosives, as well as inflammatory posters and pamphlets, and they took into custody many Communists already wanted for various offences. They also provided the police with much useful documentary material for intelligence purposes. As a historical note, and one perhaps of some interest to readers militarily inclined, it is believed that the problem of assaulting a modern multi-storey building was first tackled in the course of these operations when a combined force of British infantry and (mostly Chinese) police landed on the roof of a 27-storey building from Royal Naval helicopters and carried it from the roof downwards. This operation was a remarkable example of inter-service co-operation executed at short notice, and one for which every constable in the Bay View Police Division volunteered.

15. These counter-attacks had a considerable adverse effect on Communist morale and on its leadership and planning. At the same time they had a tonic effect on the morale of the police and on the public generally. The initial police raids were fiercely resisted and resulted in Communist casualties, but thereafter there was little resistance and, with the constant threat of police action, Communist leaders abandoned their usual meeting places and were steadily driven underground. Sporadic violence continued during July but showed an increasing lack of direction and was more the work of individual extremist groups.

16. The Communist Press, however, continued unabated its virulent campaign of abuse, threats and calls for armed insurrection. In August it became necessary to suppress three newspapers and to prosecute their editors for sedition. This action, together with the arrest for criminal activities of minor employees of the New China News Agency, brought about a violent reaction from Peking. In July the Reuters correspondent in Peking had been put under house arrest in retaliation for the arrest of an NCNA reporter. In August a strong protest was made to London demanding the release of all NCNA employees arrested, and the withdrawal of action against the newspapers and their editors within 48 hours. The protest was rejected and the CPG retaliated, not against Hong Kong, but by setting a mob on the office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking.

17. Since the middle of July, with the continuing police raids on centres of subversion, the cause of confrontation steadily deteriorated. With the growing realisation that they must stand on their own feet, the Communists began to talk increasingly of "a long hard struggle ".

a long hard struggle ". In August they threatened a wave of terrorism by publishing lists of prominent persons in the Colony who were marked for assassination. There had in fact been only one victim, a prominent Chinese commentator on the commercial wireless programme who specialised in ridiculing the Communist cause. But the manner of his death was particularly vicious: he and his cousin were stopped while driving to work, drenched in petrol and burned to death-an action which aroused much public indignation and contempt.

CONFIDENTIAL

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