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but to do so would represent a major change in policy towards the Colony and this seems unlikely. However, in future, if the threat of sabotage were assessed as significant, consideration would have to be given to increasing the protection offered to buildings and aircraft and to moving U.S. naval vessels to the least vulnerable anchorages.
7.
The use of nuclear weapons or an American invasion of North Vietnam, with the possibility of intervention by Chinese "volunteers" would pose an entirely new set of problems. Certainly the C.P.G. would be likely to reassess its policies towards the Colony, and in particular might raise more strenuous objections to the continued use of Hong Kong by U.S. R. & R. personnel.
Food
8.
Small quantities of pigs, pork and poultry are imported from North Vietnam while South Vietnam has always been a potential source for very limited numbers of cattle,
The direct impact of increased pigs, poultry and vegetables. hostilities would be small. The danger is of the effects on
Both Cambodia and Thailand, neighbouring countries.
particularly the latter, provide us with livestock though
not in major quantities.
The main problem is rice should
Thailand, one of the world's major exporters, be forced by internal
This would present grave disorder to reduce its output. problems.
CONCLUSIONS.
9.
It is concluded that :-
(a) In present circumstances it is unlikely that
Communist policy towards Hong Kong will change. (b) There are no indications of any increase in
Communist inspired anti-American activities in the Colony but any incident involving U.S. servicemen could be exploited by local militants.
(0)
The C.P.G. may instigate an anti-U.S. campaign in
Such a the event of a major Vietcong setback. campaign could be difficult to control but is not considered likely.
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/ (a) .....
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