TNAG-0061-FCO40-97-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 135

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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Part I to COS 25th Meeting/68 30th April 1968

revert to overt action. It would be wrong to assess that the security forces had overcome the Communist actions last summer; rather it was the Communists who had backed down. Public morale was generally good but the younger element were becoming increasingly aware of the approach of the end of the leasehold in 1997. This was most apparent amongst the professional classes such as doctors, engineers, etc., but as yet had not had an effect on recruitment for the police.

In re ply to questions SIR DAVID TRENCH said that police morale was allied to public morale. Throughout the recent disturbances the police were popular and received great support from the public. The police were now gradually replacing Army units in some areas on the border and the question of the division of responsibility there between the military and the police was being most carefully reviewed. Intelligence received over the border was not as great as he would have liked; the greatest lack was intelligence about the immediate border area.

SIR CHARLES ELWORTHY then raised the question of the agreed force levels for the Garrison. He was aware that the Governor was most keen that fighter aircraft should be permanently positioned in the Colony but the Committee had been unable to justify their inclusion on purely military grounds. In the immediate future aircraft could be flown from Singapore and in the long term Phantoms could be provided from the United Kingdom together with any other reinforcements required. He appreciated that the Governor's request stemmed from the need for maintaining morale in the Colony, and that it was supported by the Commonwealth Secretary. The Secretary of State had stated that the Governor's viewpoint would be taken fully into consideration. However he would invite the Governor to make any additional comments.

SIR DAVID TRENCH said that he considered the proposed naval and land force strengths to be adequate. The small increase in naval forces would necessitate some reconsideration of storage and married quarters requirements. With regard to the fighter aircraft, he found it difficult to differentiate between the political and military arguments but the Committee would have seen the arguments which he had already submitted. He would however like to add one point. If no air defence was provided for Hong Kong, China could complain that this would leave a gap which could be used by possible enemies, as had occurred in 1951 when Nationalist Chinese aircraft overflew Hong Kong before making incursions into China. China might therefore claim the right to provide fighter patrols over the Colony. He would, however, like to propose a possible intermediate solution for investigation whereby a small element of four to five fighters and six pilots might be retained in the Colony with a small ground staff, and that this element should be backed by Auxiliary Air Force personnel provided by the Colony. The unit would be under the command of the Air Force Commander. Maintenance might be provided by the Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Corporation (HAEC). Such a unit would seem adequate to meet the requirement, and it would be cheaper for the Hong Kong Government who would have to meet the cost.

AIR MARSHAL FLETCHER (Representing the Chief of the Air Staff) said that, militarily, the positioning of four or five Hunters would provide only minimal defence but it could make political sense. Such a force could be supplemented by visits of Phantoms although it could not be stated at this stage how frequent such visits would be. There was at present a general

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