TNAG-0061-FCO40-97-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 119

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ANNEX

133

Background

Our withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by the end of 1971 compels us to review the strength of the Hong Kong Garrison. Now, and until our withdrawal, we will still have forces in the Far East and can reinforce surely and quickly from Singapore. After our withdrawal we must maintain in Hong Kong forces that, even without reinforcement are adequate for the tasks given to them. To fail to do so would be to run unacceptable risks not only in circumstances in which our forces were called upon to intervene, but also in a progressive decline in the morale of the local population, on the state of which our position in the Colony depends. Communist China will be aware that reinforcements for the Garrison will have to come from the European theatre and, consequently, may exploit the psychological effect on the inhabitants of the Colony of the comparative isolation of British forces. In addition, the withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore will not be lost on the population of Hong Kong. Their morale will be particularly sensitive to the knowledge that there will be no reserves in the area. In these circumstances, much will depend on buoying up the expectations of both Europeans and Asians and avoiding a crisis of confidence in the Colony.

2.

So long therefore as we are responsible for Hong Kong we must keep forces in the Colony that are fully adequate for their tasks. These are the maintenance of internal security, the effective control of the border, and an ability to expose as aggression any Chinese incursion by armed forces. Incidents requiring the intervention of our forces arise too suddenly and escalate too steeply to permit of delays in reinforcement: as our forces in the area run down, reinforce- ment times from further afield pass the limits of safety.

Present Position

3. When the strength of the Hong Kong Garrison was considered at OPD (66)49th Meeting on 19th December, 1966, it was conclu- ded that the Army element should be reduced during 1967/68 by one major unit from its then level of 63rds major units: the precise timing of the announcement of this and of the move itself were left for separate consideration after the Macao situation had settled down. Subsequently, at OPD (67) 29th Meeting on 5th September, 1967, it was decided that the decision to reduce the Garrison should be placed in abeyance for the time being, though it should remain our eventual objective.

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4. Since the consideration in December, 1966, we have been faced with serious and prolonged internal disturbances in Hong Kong, and with a difficult situation on the border; garrison was therefore reinforced with an additional battalion from Malaysia/Singapore in June, 1967, making 73rds units, which is still its strength. And since the discussion in September, 1967 it was decided in January, 1968 to complete our withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by the end of 1971, and to abandon our previous plans to maintain a special capability for use in the area. We also announced in January that there was no question of reducing the strength or effectiveness of the Hong Kong Garrison.

5. We can, at present, meet our naval commitment with a single frigate, and only two Mine Counter-Measure Vessels need to be kept on station. The Commander-in-Chicf Far East can guarantee from the forces now available to him, to

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