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(with assistance from H.M.G. where necessary). Where on occasions
U.K. forces have been needed for internal security the practice
uncts
it
as restated in the inter-departmental ruling quoted in para 10 of
the Annex) has been to require the territory to reimburse the
"extra" (or "extra budgetary") costs of the visits so employed;
is a new concept to talk in terms of a territory meeting the full
budgetary cost. In addition a few territories have contributed
towards "Commonwealth defence generally"; Hong Kong is one of these.
26.
In Hong Kong the development of the local forces police
and military has largely reached the limits for the role such
forces can serve. Given the nature of the threat (China), local
forces cannot be entrusted with entire responsibility because they
are preponderantly Chinese in composition and in an emergency
engineered by China we could not entirely rely on them. We need
British forces in Hong Kong to stiffen the local forces in such
situations.
· 27.
It is this link between the external and internal threat that
vitiates MOD attempts to attribute a purely internal security role
10 for elements in our forces and to assess on this basis what contri-
bution Hong Kong should pay (paras 9-13 of Speaking Notes). Defence
and internal security are inextricably linked in Hong Kong and this
has been the case throughout the Colony's history. Since 1863 the
Colony has met its obligation to contribute to the military forces
(and elsewhere) maintained there by H.M.G. through an annual contribution to
defence which has varied from an agreed percentage of revenue to a
fixed sum negotiated from time to time.
There seem no good argu-
mentfor varying that arrangement. There is reason to think from
discussions at official level that the Treasury may have some
sympathy for this view and may not support the Ministry of Defence arguments.7
28. In the course of official discussions on this paper the
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/Treasury
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.